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Under Construction: Towards a More
Deferential Standard of Review in Claim
Construction Cases
Jeffrey Peabody*
Introduction
In patent law, a patent's claims define its metes and bounds; broader claims
grant the patentee greater power to exclude others from practicing the inven-
tion.' Similarly, more narrow claims will give the patentee less ability to control
the actions of others. While other patent validity requirements (nonobvious-
ness, novelty, and utility) act as outer limits on claim scope, the general rule
is that patent applicants seek to have the broadest claims possible.
The United States Patent and Trademark Office must approve a patent
applicant's claims before the patent can be issued.' Issuing a patent, however,
does not mean that the patent's 'metes and bounds' are conclusively estab-
lished; trial courts are left to determine what exactly the claim terms mean.3
This process of claim construction is particularly important in infringement
cases. Whether the claim covers, or reads on, an allegedly infringing device
depends on what meaning the trial judge assigns to the words contained
within the patent itself. To reach this decision, the trial judge may rely on
several sources of information: the patent and its supporting documents,
technical dictionaries, even evidence from experts within the technological
field.4 While claim construction is often viewed as a preliminary matter, and
* J.D. Candidate, 2008, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington, registered
patent agent. Thanks to my wife Melissa and daughter Emerson for their love and inspira-
tion. Thanks also to Kevin Collins for his advice and feedback.
See In re Vamco Mach. & Tool, Inc., 752 E2d 1564, 1577 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("[C]
laims are not technical descriptions of the disclosed inventions but are legal documents like
the descriptions of lands by metes and bounds in a deed which define the area conveyed but
do not describe the land.").
2 See 35 U.S.C. § 131 (2000).
3 See In re Vamco, 752 E2d at 1577 n.5.
4 These sources of evidence are typically divided into two classes: intrinsic evidence (the
patent specification, claims, and prosecution history), and extrinsic evidence (dictionaries,
expert testimony, etc.). See John M. Romary & Arie M. Michelsohn, Patent Claim Inter-
pretation After Markman: How the Federal Circuit Interprets Claims, 46 AM. U. L. Rev.
1887 n. 1I (1997). Courts are only to turn to extrinsic evidence when necessary to properly
506 THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT BAR JOURNAL VOL. 17, No. 4
handled within a special Markman hearing, defining the claims' scope is often
outcome-determinative of the broader question of infringement.'
This article addresses the question of what standard of review is appropriate
for appellate courts to use when reviewing the trial court's claim construction.
Is claim construction purely a question of law? Is it some mix of fact and law?
Should this affect how the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal
Circuit), which has jurisdiction over all patent appeals, reviews claim con-
struction decisions by lower courts? Perhaps most importantly, is the current
de novo standard of review the best choice?
This article argues that the status quo fails to achieve the goals of consistency
and accuracy which both Congress and the Supreme Court envisioned, and
that a more deferential standard of review would yield better decisions. Part
I discusses the history behind the Federal Circuit's use of de novo review as
applied to claim construction issues. Part II points to signs suggesting that,
at least internally, the Federal Circuit recognizes inherent limitations in the
status quo, and yet is still reluctant to change the standard of review. Part
III provides a survey of proposed changes, coupled with a normative view
towards a more deferential standard such as clearly erroneous. Finally, Part IV
discusses Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.,6 and why the Supreme
Court should have seized this opportunity to establish a more deferential
standard for appellate claim construction review.
I. History of De Novo Review
A. The Markman Cases
Before discussing the history of the appellate standard of review for claim
construction, it is important to outline the shifting conception of who is
responsible for determining the meaning of patent claims at the trial level.
Prior to 1995, claim construction issues were typically decided by the jury.7
understand the intrinsic evidence. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 E3d 1303, 1319 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) ("In sum, extrinsic evidence may be useful to the court, but it is unlikely to
result in a reliable interpretation of patent claim scope unless considered in the context of
the intrinsic evidence.").
5 See Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 E2d 1561, 1567-68 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
("Claim interpretation, in light of the specification, claim language, other claims, and pros-
ecution history, is a matter of law and will normally control the remainder of the decisional
process."); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman 1), 52 F.3d 967, 989 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (en banc) (Mayer, J., concurring) ("[T]o decide what the claims mean is nearly
always to decide the case."), affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
6 469 E3d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 2270 (2007).
7 See, e.g., Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 343 (1853) ("[]t is the duty of the courts
and juries to look through the form for the substance of the invention-for that which
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Arguably, the Seventh Amendment applied equally to patent infringement
cases as to other cases. Thus, parties had a right to have a jury determine the
ultimate scope of a patent claim.8
However, in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,9 the trial judge in-
structed the jury to consider all relevant evidence in making their final claim
construction. ° After the jury found in favor of a plaintiff, the trial judge
determined that, as a matter of law, the correct claim construction precluded
a finding of infringement, and entered judgment in favor of the defendant.1
The plaintiff appealed to the Federal Circuit, claiming that this violated his
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.1 2 The Federal Circuit, sitting en
banc, affirmed the lower court, finding that "the court has the power and
obligation to construe as a matter oflaw the meaning of language used in the
patent claim."' 3 The Supreme Court, in Markman If,14 upheld the Federal
Circuit opinion, finding that claim construction is "the exclusive province
of the court."1 5
By holding that judges are responsible for claim construction, the Court in
Markman II focused on practical considerations: the judge was simply better
suited to handle this responsibility than the jury and a desire for uniformity. 16
Comparing claim construction to the legal interpretation of other written
documents, the unanimous majority stated that: "The judge, from his training
and discipline, is more likely to give a proper interpretation to such instru-
ments than a jury; he is, therefore, more likely to be right, in performing such
a duty, than a jury can be expected to be." 1 7 The question, then, became one
more about accuracy than about the propriety ofwhich institutional body (the
judge or the jury) should make the final determination. Given the fact that
entitled the inventor to his patent, and which the patent was designed to secure"); Silsby
v. Foote, 55 U.S. 218, 226 (1852) (explaining that whether particular parts of an allegedly
infringing device described by the patent is a question for jury).
8 U.S. CoNsT. amend. VII. ("In suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.")
9 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), afid, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
tO Id. at 973.
Id.
12 See id. at 984.
13 Id. at 979 (emphasis added).
"4 Markman v. Wesrview Instruments, Inc. (Markman I!), 517 U.S. 370 (1996), affg 52
F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
15 Id. at 376.
16 Id. at 388-90.
"7 Id. at 388-89 (quoting Parker v. Hulme, 18 F. Cas. 1138, 1140 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1849)
(No. 10,740)).
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the claim construction is routinely dispositive of the entire case,18 granting
trial judges complete control over claim construction often has the practical,
if not legal, effect of completely depriving the parties of a jury trial.
A second consideration for the Court in Markman !!was a desire for uni-
formity in the treatment of any given patent.' 9 Though the Court recognized
that issue preclusion would "ordinarily foster uniformity," even if the decision
was left in the hands of the jury, the Court opted in favor of treating claim
construction as a purely legal question, believing that stare decisis would
"promote (though it will not guarantee) intrajurisdictional certainty" and that
ultimately interjurisdictional uniformity would come through the author-
ity of the single appeals court.2 ° This result, the Court argued, is consistent
with the underlying purpose for the creation of the Federal Circuit in the
first place-Congress wanted one appellate court that would have exclusive
jurisdiction over patent cases. 2
This resolved the issue of the proper methodology for claim construction,
but did nothing to resolve the question of what standard of review should be
applied by the Federal Circuit when reviewing claim construction issues.22 This
question was previously left ambiguous after earlier opinions of the Federal
Circuit.23 In Markman I, the Federal Circuit held that claim construction
should be reviewed at the appellate level under a de novo standard as a purely
legal question.24 The Supreme Court passed on this question in Markman II,
although it did reiterate that claim construction "falls somewhere between
a pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact."25 This created some
doubt as to whether Markman Iwas still good law.26 The Federal Circuit re-
sponded quickly, in Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc.27 wherein the court
1" See e.g., Gregory A. Castanias et al., Survey of the Federal Circuit's Patent Law Decisions
in 2006: A New Chapter in the Ongoing Dialogue with the Supreme Court, 56 Am. U. L. REv.
793, 902 (2007).
'9 Markman I 517 U.S. at 390.
20 Id. at 391.
21 Id. at 390.
22 But see Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 E3d 1448 (Fed. Cit. 1998) (en banc)
(reaffirming that claim construction, as a purely legal question, is reviewed de novo).
23 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman 1), 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cit.
1995) (en banc) (collecting inconsistent cases), affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
24 Markman 1, 138 F.3d at 979.
25 Markman II, 517 U.S. at 388 (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114
(1985)).
26 See Thomas F. Zuber, Revisiting Markman-Cybor: Good Law But for How Long?, Aug.
22, 2007, http://www.zuberlaw.com/lawfirm/articles/revisiting-markman-cybor-good
law-but for howilong/.
27 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
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reestablished that claim construction was a purely legal question, subject to
de novo review. 2
B. Cybor Corp.
In Cybor, the Federal Circuit squarely addressed the question of what ef-
fect, if any, Markman !!had on the holding in Markman L29 A divided panel
held that the Supreme Court did not intend to modify or reverse the Federal
Circuit's holding that claim construction is subject to de novo review. 30 In
reaching this decision, the Cybor court had to overrule several post-Markman
H cases applying a deferential standard of review.3 1 The Cybor court also had
to contend with the language of Markman II itself which was accomplished
through a semantic sleight-of-hand: "These characterizations [that claim
construction is a mixed question of law and fact], however, are onlyprefatory
comments demonstrating the Supreme Court's recognition that the determina-
tion of whether patent claim construction is a question of law or fact is not
simple or clear cut .... "32 The Cybor court read the Supreme Court's silence
on the standard of review issue as an implicit endorsement of the Federal
Circuit's de novo standard.33
The Federal Circuit did not easily reach its decision in Cybor. The opinion
generated four separate concurrences and "additional views," as well as an oft-
quoted dissent by Judge Rader.34 These separate opinions form the beginning
of the internal conflict within the Federal Circuit that continues to this day.35
They have also provided ammunition for critics of de novo review who point
to empirical studies that undermine the rationale behind the standard.36 Part
III will discuss Cybor's concurrences and dissent in greater detail.
28 Id. at 1451.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 1456.
31 Id. (overruling Fromson v. Anitec Printing Plates, Inc., 132 E3d 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1997);
Eastman Kodak Co. v. GoodyearTire & Rubber Co., 114 E3d 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Wiener
v. NEC Elecs., Inc., 102 E3d 534 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Metaullics Sys. Co., L.P. v. Cooper, 100
F.3d 938 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
32 Id. at 1455 (emphasis added).
31 Id. at 1455 n.4 (noting that if the Supreme Court had intended to leave claim con-
struction a mixed question of fact and law, "surely the Supreme Court would have discussed
whether subsidiary or underlying fact questions should be decided by the judge or jury").
34 See id. at 1450-51.
31 See Thomas F. Zuber, Revisiting Markman-Cybor: Good Law But for How Long?, Aug.
22, 2007, http://www.zuberlaw.com/lawfirm/articles/revisiting-markman-cyborgood
law but for howilong/.
36 See infra Part II.C.
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C. Phillips v. AWH
Cybor was the final word on the subject for seven years, until the Federal
Circuit heard Phillips v. AWH Corp. 37 In an unusual move, the Federal Circuit
asked for briefing from the parties and amici on seven questions.38 While the
majority of the questions dealt with the methodology of claim construction,
namely the appropriate use of dictionaries and other extrinsic sources, Question
Seven asked: "Consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in [Markman I]
and our en banc decision in [Cybor], is it appropriate for this court to accord
any deference to any aspect of trial court claim construction rulings? If so,
on what aspects, in what circumstances, and to what extent? 39
Observers expected the Federal Circuit to squarely face the issue of appellate
review of claim construction and the request for responses (which generated
amicus briefs from a healthy response from the legal community, with over
thirty companies, industry organizations, and government agencies).40 Yet,
instead of addressing the mounting criticism and doubt over the Markman I
and Cybor decisions, the Federal Circuit merely stated: "After consideration
of the matter, we have decided not to address that issue at this time. We
therefore leave undisturbed our prior en banc decision in Cybor."' The Fed-
eral Circuit provided no reasoning as to why the Federal Circuit passed on
this opportunity to shore up its earlier arguments in favor of more stringent
appellate review.42
Judge Mayer, joined by Judge Newman, lashed out at the majority in his
dissent for failing to give even provide a cursory explanation for why Question
Seven was ignored: "[Today] we say nothing new, but merely restate what
has become the practice over the last ten years-that we will decide cases
according to whatever mode or method results in the outcome we desire,
or at least allows us a seemingly plausible way out of the case. '4 3 Calling the
Federal Circuit's claim construction rulings nothing more than "interpretive
necromancy," Mayer predicted that any attempt to develop a consistent ap-
proach under the de novo standard would be pointless."
7 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
38 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1382-83 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (granting rehearing
en banc).
39 Id.
40 See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1330 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
41 Id. at 1328 (majority opinion).
42 See id.
41 Id. at 1330 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
44 Id. (quoting The Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S.
826, 833 (2002)).
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D. Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.
The final noteworthy decision dealing with whether the Federal Circuit
should afford deference to lower court claim construction was actually a de-
nial of rehearing en banc.45 In Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., the
Federal Circuit considered a petition for rehearing that would have provided
it with an opportunity to revisit the de novo standard.46 The rehearing was
denied, but not without six separate opinions suggesting that a majority of
the Circuit is ready to rethink at least some aspects of Cybor.47
II. An Undercurrent of Doubt
As Part I discussed, the Federal Circuit did not easily conclude that de
novo review was the appropriate standard to apply in claim construction
cases.48 Part II discusses criticisms of the Cybor decision, both from Federal
Circuit judges and from outside empiricists. It ends with an examination of
empirical studies that have largely confirmed the failure of Cybor to create
certainty and uniformity.
A. Cybor's Critics
In Cybor, the Federal Circuit had to decide what effect Markman Jlhad on
its earlier ruling that claim construction was a purely legal question subject to
de novo review.49 Finding no clear command from the Supreme Court that
Markman I was incorrectly decided, the majority in Cybor concluded that
de novo review was still appropriate.5 0 Chief Judge Mayer's concurrence, as
well as Judge Rader's dissent, took issue with this ruling. 1
Chief Judge Mayer's concurrence agrees with the majority's result, but not
its reasoning. 2 Stating the majority opinion "profoundly misapprehends"
Markman /, he notes that the Supreme Court did not explicitly adopt or
approve of the Federal Circuit's approach in Markman I, even though it could
have easily done so.53 ChiefJudge Mayer pointed out that the Federal Circuit,
"5 SeeAmgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 E3d 1039, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(Michel, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2270 (2007).
46 Id.
47 See id.
48 See supra Part I.A-B.
49 Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F3d 1448, 1454-55 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en
banc).
50 Id. at 1456.
1' Id. at 1463 (Mayer, C.J., concurring); id. at 1473 (Rader, J., dissenting).
52 Id. at 1463 (Mayer, C.J., concurring).
51 Id. at 1463-64 ("It would have been a simple matter for the Court to give short shrift
to this argument by proclaiming construction purely, solely, and always a matter of law that
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only months before Cybor, had applied a clearly erroneous standard to factual
findings made by the trial judge in Fromson v. Anitec Printing Plates, Inc.,54
and questioned the court's ability to overturn such recent precedent: "If this
court does not believe the claim construction to be erroneous based on an
independent review of the legal conclusions and a review of the constituent
factual findings for substantial evidence, it must affirm. 55
Judge Rader's dissent was blunt: "[T]his rejection of the trial process as
the 'main event' will undermine, if not destroy, the values of certainty and
predictability sought by Markman L1" 56 Judge Rader did not challenge the
decision that claim construction should be the responsibility of the trial judge.
Instead he questioned the implicit notion of the majority that the process of
claim construction involved no fact-finding. 57 His complaint was not about
who did claim construction, but rather how it was done.5" By reviewing claim
construction de novo, the Federal Circuit intentionally ignored the obvious,
namely that trial judges are not universally equipped to properly construe
claim terms without resorting to outside help.59 Claim construction is fun-
damentally different from contract interpretation because the question is not
simply what do the terms mean, but rather what do the terms mean to a person
of ordinary skill in the art.6 ° Judge Rader's dissent quoted a district court that
was already frustrated with the Federal Circuit's head-in-the-sand approach:
"[W]hen the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals states that the trial court does
not do something that the trial court does and must do to perform the judicial
function, the court knowingly enters a land of sophistry and fiction. 61
Judge Rader noted that the rationale behind Markman I was that earlier
certainty in claim construction disputes would lead to earlier settlement.6 2
Providing litigants with a clear idea of what to expect at trial would foster
settlements and reduce both litigation expense and administrative burden
would never have gone to the jury.").
5 132 E3d 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
5 Id. at 1465.
56 Id. at 1474 (Rader, J., dissenting).
57 See id. at 1478.
58 See id. ("In Markman I, this court en banc declared that claim interpretation resides
solely with the judge. The Supreme Court agreed. By removing lay juries from complex tech-
nological decisions, these decisions promised to improve the predictability and uniformity
of patent law.") (citations omitted).
19 See id. at 1474 ("When confronted with sophisticated technology, district court judges
often seek testimony from experts to help them understand and interpret the claim.").
60 See id. at 1475.
61 Id. (quoting Lucas Aerospace, Ltd. v. Unison Indus., L.P., 890 F. Supp. 329, 333-34
n.7 (D. Del. 1995).
62 Id.
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on the courts. 63 If the purpose of Markman I was to provide early claim
construction, subjecting that determination to de novo review eliminates any
advantage that an early claim interpretation could provide. Because a trial
court's interpretation of a patent claim is given no deference at the appellate
level, litigants must wait until the entire litigation process has concluded
before they can reasonably assess their case, "at which point, of course, every
outcome is certain anyway."64
B. The Amgen Denial
The Federal Circuit's decision to not rehear Amgen is a missed opportunity
to reconsider the Federal Circuit's decision in Cybor. Although the court de-
cided to pass on the case, six separate opinions document the internal belief
by a majority of the Federal Circuit that some form of change is needed.65
In a joint dissent, Judges Michel and Judge Rader point to four "practical
problems" that the de novo standard created.66 Given Judge Rader's strong
dissent in the original case to adopt a no deference standard, it is not surpris-
ing that both judges question the analogy of claim construction to statutory
interpretation and would be willing to reconsider all aspects of the Cybor
decision.67
Judge Newman's dissent challenges the methodology of claim construc-
tion adopted by the court.68 In Phillips v. AWH Corp., the court held that
claims cannot be construed more broadly then the invention itself.69 Judge
Newman argues that in doing just that, the panel majority in Amgen imper-
missibly broadened the scope of the claim so that it was invalidated by prior
art.7' Asking only that the Federal Circuit faithfully apply the appropriate
standard, regardless of how the issue is framed, Judge Newman hesitates to
answer the question of whether claim construction is a matter of law or a
matter of fact.71 If claim construction is truly a matter of law, then the court
must follow the "fundamental principles" of claim construction set forth
63 Id. This is particularly true in infringement cases that are typically won or lost based
on the meaning assigned to the critical claims at issue.
64 Id. at 1476.
65 See Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 E3d 1039, 1040 (Fed. Cir.
2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2270 (2007).
66 Id. (Michel, C.J., dissenting).
7 See id. at 1040-41.
68 Id. at 1041 (Newman, J., dissenting).
69 Id.
70 Id.
7' Seeid. at 1043.
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in earlier cases.72 If claim construction is based on a case-specific finding of
fact, then "appellate review warrants deference to the trier of fact, a deference
here lacking. '73 Finally, Judge Newman argues that appellate review of claim
construction should be modeled after how courts handle Daubert scientific
findings, 74 and the Federal Circuit's insistence on a more stringent standard
of review has "not well withstood the test of experience. 75
In his dissent, Judge Rader openly attacks the court's insistence on de novo
review, despite the Supreme Court's own remark that claim construction is
a mixed question of law and fact. 76 Because the trial court "has more tools,
more time, and more direct contact with factual evidence," Judge Rader
would give greater deference to the inherently factual determinations made
by trial judges.77
Judges Gajarsa, Linn, and Dyk concurred jointly in the denial. 78 Their
concurrence indicates a willingness to reconsider "limited aspects" of Cybor
if the appropriate case were to arise. 79 For these judges, the appropriate case
would be one where the final claim construction necessarily required the
district court to resolve conflicting expert testimony.80 Because the district
court in Amgen construed the claims without resort to expert evidence, no
deference was due to the lower court's legal interpretation.81
Even a cursory examination of these dissenting opinions reveals that, for
many of the Federal Circuit judges, the Cybor decision did not clarify or bring
uniformity to the claim construction process.82 Because the Federal Circuit
has chosen not to address this issue en banc, the Supreme Court should
have stepped in and provided clear guidance to the lower courts; instead, the
problems of de novo review persist' With the Court's recent focus on patent
72 Id. at 1042-43.
73 Id. at 1043.
" Id. at 1043 (referring to Dauberthearings as created in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm.,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)).
75 Id. (Newman, J., dissenting).
76 Id. at 1044 (Rader, J., dissenting).
77 Id.
78 Id. at 1045 (Gajarsa, Linn & Dyk, JJ., concurring).
79 Id.
80 Id.
8' Id. This highlights a problem pointed out by Judge Rader-district courts understand
that they are not allowed to rest their decision on expert testimony, yet they need that testi-
mony in order to even understand the issues. Id. at 1044 (Rader, J., dissenting). The district
courts have learned to take in the testimony, but disavow any reliance upon it in reaching
their legal conclusion. Id.
82 See id. at 1040 (Michel, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that Cybor creates unpredictability
about appellate outcomes, confounding trial judges and discouraging settlements).
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law, many believe that the Court should have seized upon the Amgen case as
its vehicle for exploring the policy implications of de novo review.13 Part IV,
infra, will discuss the Amgen writ in greater detail and why the Court should
have accepted it.
C. Empirical Studies of the Current De Novo Standard of Review
Since the Federal Circuit seems reluctant to change its de novo review
standard, the question becomes whether there is any need for change. If the
current review system generates the uniformity and certainty that Markman
II sought to create, then perhaps adopting a more deferential standard is un-
necessary. This section explores the empirical studies conducted post- Cyborand
concludes that the current system is not creating uniformity or certainty.
One of the earliest empirical studies of post-Cybor Federal Circuit opin-
ions was conducted by Christian Chu in 2001.84 After reviewing 502 patent
appeals heard between January 1998 and April 2000, Chu noted that the
reversal rate for all issues, including claim construction, hovered around 37%. 85
When Chu focused on claim construction cases, he noted that there was an
increase in the rate that the Federal Circuit changed claim construction on
appeal.86 Perhaps more significantly, when the Federal Circuit modified the
claim interpretations, the reversal rate rose dramatically to 68%.87 This high-
lights the uncertainty that de novo review brings to patent law-not only are
claims frequently reinterpreted at the appellate level, but such modifications
very often bring a reversal of the lower court decision. Despite this increas-
ing trend towards reversal, Chu noted that the overall reversal rate for claim
construction cases was actually lower (29.6%) than the 37.3% rate of claim
construction reversal cited by Judge Rader in Cybor.88
Judge Moore, now sitting on the Federal Circuit, conducted a more recent
study and determined that the Federal Circuit held that the district court
incorrectly interpreted 34.5% of all claim terms that were appealed.8 9 The
Federal Circuit reversed or vacated the district court's decision in 29.7% of
83 But see Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2270 (2007), denying
cert. to 469 F.3d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
84 Christian A. Chu, EmpiricalAnalysis of the Federal Circuit's Claim Construction Trends,
16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075 (2001).
85 Id. at 1098-1100 (finding overall reversal rate of 47.3% among written opinions and
a reversal rate of 36.6% when summary affirmances were included).
86 Id. at 1101.
17 Id. at 1104.
88 Id.
89 Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Predict-
able?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 231, 233 (2005).
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the cases where the district court was found to have misinterpreted the patent
claims. 90 The study confirms that while there was a slight decrease in reversal
rates as time passed after Markman, the post- Cybor time span has seen increas-
ing claim construction reversal rates.9 Judge Moore placed the blame squarely
with the Federal Circuit because the court failed to develop clear guidelines for
claim construction. The higher reversal rate, however, must also be attributed
to the non-deferential scrutiny the district courts face. 92 Unfettered de novo
review allows the Federal Circuit, which already has exclusive jurisdiction
over patent appeals, to position itself as the sole arbiter of what constitutes
valid claim construction. The institutional limitations of the Federal Circuit,
as discussed earlier, are only exasperated by the lack of restraints placed upon
the Circuit's review of district court decisions.
III. Proposed Changes
Since Markman I, the Federal Circuit has held that claim construction,
despite its dependence on factual underpinnings, is exclusively a legal ques-
tion, and should be reviewed de novo at the appellate level.93 But is this the
right approach? Does de novo review promote the Supreme Court's twin goals
in its Markman II decision, namely uniformity and accuracy? This Part will
discuss the relative merits of de novo review as opposed to the more deferential
standard of clearly erroneous.
A. Structural Versus Methodological Status Quo
In discussing the current claim construction appellate review system, it is
easy to conflate the questions of who should do claim construction and how
claim construction should be done. While this paper focuses more on the how
of claim construction review, a few words about the structure of the appeals
process is necessary. Several papers have proposed changes to the current one
court to rule them all approach to patent appeals, most operating under the
assumption that the de novo standard would continue to control how the
Federal Circuit reviews claim construction. 4 After briefly exploring some
of these proposals, this section will suggest that organizational changes may
90 Id. at 239.
91 Id. at 246.
92 See id. at 247.
91 Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 1039, 1044 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(Rader, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2270 (2007).
9' See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing Experiment in
Specialization, 54 CASE W RES. L. REv. 769 (2004); John B. Pegram, Should There be a U.S.
Trial Court with a Specialization in Patent Litigation?, 82 J. PAT. & TPREMRK OFF. Soc'Y
766 (2000); Gregory J. Wallace, Toward Certainty and Uniformity in Patent Infringement
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be appropriate, even if the Federal Circuit were to adopt a more deferential
standard of review.
1. Specialized Trial Courts
Recognizing that patent law involves complex issues of fact, some com-
mentators have suggested creating a specialized trial court to handle patent
cases.95 Arguably, this would have two benefits: first, since the court would
have greater expertise in claim construction issues than a typical district court,
we can expect the trial court to 'get it right' more often, and second, the
Federal Circuit may feel obligated to afford greater deference to the factual
determinations made by such a specialized court.96 Of course, if the Federal
Circuit were to adopt a more deferential standard of review, such deference
would be automatic. However, the notion of specialized trial courts obviates
some of the present difficulties faced by the Federal Circuit.
Creating a specialized patent trial court would not come without costs. The
investment in training, time, and money to create a parallel judicial system,
replete with trained judges and possibly trained juries, would be massive if
not impractical. One possible way to decrease this investment would be to
minimize the role of the jury at the trial level, and instead rely more heavily
on court-appointed experts. 97 To some degree this has already taken place in
many cases involving complex scientific facts. The Supreme Court's decision
in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.98 emphasizes the judge's role
in evaluating and admitting expert testimony.99 By extending Daubert to the
patent field, it may be possible to create a specialized patent trial court with
circumscribed jury participation.
If the Federal Circuit were to adopt a more deferential standard of review,
the benefits associated with developing a specialized trial court likely would
not outweigh the substantial costs. Furthermore, many already see the pat-
ent system as too segregated from the rest of the legal field; having a separate
Cases after Festo and Markman: A Proposalfor a Specialized Patent Trial Court with a Rule of
Greater Deference, 77 S. CAL. L. REv. 1383 (2004).
11 See Dreyfuss, supra note 94, at 798; Pegram, supra note 94, at 766-67; Wallace, supra
note 94, at 1384.
96 See Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L. REv. 329,
330-31 (1991); Wallace, supra note 94, at 1413-14.
97 See Arti K. Rai, Specialized Trial Courts: Concentrating Expertise on Fact, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 877, 892 (2002) (arguing for a more liberal use of court-appointed experts through
Federal Rule of Evidence 706).
9' 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
99 See Id. at 592-93. The Daubert standard places responsibility on trial judges to act as
gatekeepers of scientific evidence. Under a two-prong analysis, judges are required to determine
the relevancy and reliability of expert testimony before it is admitted. Id.
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judicial track for the entire patent process would increase uniformity at the
expense of breadth and diversity. 00 Finally, creating a specialized court system
for patents creates a line-drawing problem: if the rationale for the creation of
this trial court is the complex factual nature of patent cases, why not create
special trial courts for the many other areas of law that involve highly com-
plicated scientific or technical issues? Our legal system has generally avoided
the segregation of cases into separate tracks; patent law is one of the few areas
(along with tax and bankruptcy law) where the need for a special appellate
court system was deemed important enough to justify this separation.' °
2. Patent Pilot Program
An alternative to specialized trial courts is to create specialized patentjudges.
Congress has considered a pilot program that would allocate additional re-
sources to certain district courts (those facing the greatest number of patent
cases) in order to train their judges in patent law, and to hire additional law
clerks with patent law knowledge.0 2 The current version of this bill, H.R. 34,
passed the House and was referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
on February 13, 2007.' °3
The patent pilot program would choose at least five district courts, from
among the fifteen districts that decide the most patent and plant protection
cases, to participate in the program. 114 The districts must also contain at least
three judges who have volunteered to participate in the program. °5 Once
a district has been selected for participation in the pilot program, cases are
distributed randomly among all of the district's judges. 106 If a judge is assigned
a patent case, and has not elected to participate in the program, he or she can
decline the case, and have it reassigned to one of the 'patent' judges. 107
Ideally, this would funnel patent cases to a select group of judges in each
of these districts; those judges would gain experience by handling a larger
number of patent cases and would also be given "educational and professional
development" in matters relating to patent law.'08 However, while this program
may lead to more accurate trial-level decisions, there is no guarantee that it
will lead to fewer Federal Circuit reversals.
100 See Bruff, supra note 96, at 331.
10 Id. at 332-37.
102 H.R. 34, 110th Cong. (2007).
103 H.R. 34.
104 H.R. 34 § 1 (b).
105 H.R. 34 1 l(a)(1)(A), (b)(2).
106 H.R. 34 § 1(a)(1)(B)-(D).
107 H.R. 34 1 I(a)(1)(C)-(D).
'01 SeeH.R. 34§ 1 (f).
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Indeed, some evidence already suggests that such a program may have little
impact. Several districts, including the district court for the Northern District
of California, already have judges with extensive experience in patent law cases,
yet the reversal rate of decisions from these judges is not always better than
from less-experienced judges.' 09 There is also no guarantee that the judges who
self-select for the pilot program will have any greater qualification to handle
patent cases; the current proposal does not limit who can participate."l0 Ad-
ditionally, like specialized trial courts, restricting who hears patent cases to a
select few will increase tunnel vision and eliminate the breadth of viewpoints
and experience that contribute to a healthy backdrop of case law.
3. Expanding Appellate Review of Patent Cases
Another proposed institutional change would be to expand appellate review
so that it is no longer the sole province of the Federal Circuit. Craig Allen
Nard and John F. Duffy propose an expansion of appellate review in patent
cases to two or three extant circuit courts.' They argue that the pursuit for
uniformity in patent law, culminating in the creation of the Federal Circuit
in 1982, has lead to a system plagued by insularity and structurally unable to
develop incremental innovations.' 12 Uniformity, though clearly a laudable goal,
should be balanced by two other objectives: diversity and competition.
Nard and Duffy identify at least four benefits that decentralization would
bring: (1) expansion of appellate review to circuit courts will result in a more
robust and efficient development of common law; (2) sister-circuit consid-
eration of issues will create confidence in commonly-reached solutions and
provide signals to the Supreme Court in disputed approaches; (3) competi-
tive pressure between the circuits will lead to better-articulated opinions and
rationales; and (4) competition between circuits will foster greater candor,
open debate, and thoughtfulness." 3 In addition, allowing other courts to
hear patent appeals will allow a more diverse jurisprudence to develop and
will foster a closer connection between the appellate courts and the patent
community as a whole.
One of the main criticisms of this proposed expansion of appellate review
jurisdiction is that it creates the risk that the different circuits will interpret
109 See Chu, supra note 84, at 1121-24 (finding that in general, "more active" tribunals
did experience a lower reversal rate, but that even some highly-regarded districts, such as the
district court of Delaware, faced high reversal rates).
See H.R. 34 § 1(a).
III Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law's Uniformity Principle, 101
Nw. U. L. REv. 1619, 1625 (2007).
112 See id. at 1624-51.
113 Id. at 1651-55.
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the claims from a particular patent in different ways." 4 For example, the
Federal Circuit may interpret a particular claim narrowly in one infringe-
ment case, whereas one of its sister circuits may interpret it broadly in a
subsequent infringement case. This would lead to a situation in which the
patentee has different enforceable rights against different infringers. Critics
argue that this is the exact problem Congress sought to avoid by creating a
single appellate court." 5
Although Nard and Duffy acknowledge that this issue exists and could
become a common occurrence, they question how detrimental this would
be to the patent regime.' 1 6 Noting that patents are a "probabilistic property
right," Nard and Duffy suggest that patent holders have always suffered from
some uncertainty in the scope of their rights and so this result is perhaps
unavoidable and, indeed, expected. 17 Finally, they argue that the circuits
may choose to afford greater deference to the claim construction rulings of
their sister circuits, reducing the risk of disparate treatment of the same pat-
ent claim." 8
B. Adopting a More Deferential Review Standard
Empirical studies have shown that the current de novo review standard creates
several problems: high reversal rates, increased litigation costs, and frustration
for trial level judges." 9 Adopting a clearly erroneous standard would alleviate
many of these issues without having to sacrifice uniformity and consistency
in claim construction interpretation. 20 Indeed, such a standard would foster
early settlement and claim scope determination, as well as ease the burden
of the Federal Circuit by reducing the need for time-intensive review of trial
court factual determinations. 12' Finally, applying a more deferential standard
of review is not precluded by the Supreme Court's decision in Markman I.
In fact, this standard finds significant support in Markman I. 122
"' See id. at 1670.
115 See id. at 1620.
116 Id. at 1671-72.
117 See id. at 1672.
118 Id. at 1671-72.
119 See Kyle J. Fiet, Comment, Restoring the Promise of Markman: Interlocutory Patent
Appeals ReevaluatedPost-Phillips v. AWlH Corp., 84 N.C. L. REv. 1291, 1312-13 (2006).
120 See David Krinsky, 7he Supreme Court, Stare Decisis, and the Role ofAppellate Deference
in Patent Claim Construction Appeals, 66 MD. L. REv. 194, 211 (2006).
121 See id.; Wallace, supra note 94, at 1401.
122 See Krinsky, supra note 120, at 213-14; Wallace, supra note 94, at 1400.
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One of the more significant benefits of adopting a more deferential standard
of review is that the parties receive an earlier decision on claim construction. 1
2 3
While trial courts will often hold a Markman hearing at the beginning of
trial, or after discovery has taken place, the rulings made on claim construc-
tion have no sense of finality, since the Federal Circuit can (and often does)
reverse the original claim construction.'24
Some commentators have suggested employing interlocutory appeals in
order to arrive at early, definitive claim construction. 2 5 While the Federal
Circuit has jurisdiction and authority to hear interlocutory appeals on claim
construction, they have been very reluctant to do so, preferring instead to
rehear the entire case after an appealable judgment has been entered. 2 6 Would
interlocutory appeals provide an answer? One potential pitfall is that interlocu-
tory appeals would take place pre-trial, before any substantial record has been
established. 12 7 Because many patent claims cannot be interpreted without at
least some outside references, it may become difficult for the Federal Circuit
123 See Wallace, supra note 94, at 1400-01.
124 See Krinsky, supra note 120, at 211.
125 See Fiet, supra note 119, at 1321 (arguing that interlocutory appeals retain "the posi-
tive attributes of de novo review (unfettered expert review and expedited, pre-trial claim
construction) while mitigating its detrimental effects (inefficiency and trivialized trial court
proceedings)"); Krinsky, supra note 120, at 211; Craig Allen Nard, Process Considerations in
theAge ofMarkman andMantras, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 355, 378 (suggesting that Markman
decisions should be appealable by right).
Some industry groups have come out against the idea of interlocutory appeals by right-
for example, the Intellectual Property Owners Association (a trade organization for patent
holders) passed a Board Resolution in December, 2006, in opposition to proposed Senate
legislation that would grant interlocutory appeals on claim construction as of right. Intel-
lectual Property Owners Association, 2006 Resolution, http://www.ipo.org/AM/Template.
cfm?Section=BoardResolutions and PositionStatements&Template=/CM/ContentDis-
play.cfm&ContentlD= 1746.
126 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c) (1) (2000) (providing the Federal Circuit with exclusive jurisdiction
to hear interlocutory appeals arising out of claim construction issues). Since the Markman
I decision, the Federal Circuit has declined to hear any interlocutory appeals predicated on
an erroneous trial-level claim construction. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d
1448, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (Newman, J., concurring) ("The Federal Circuit
has thus far declined all such certified questions"); but cf Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Dako N. Am., 477 E3d 1335, 1336-37 (Fed. Cit. 2007) (granting interlocutory appeal
for a patent claim construction) (" This is not an ordinary case of claim construction in which,
for example, a district court has decided a claim construction issue and one party asserts
error.... Because the matters in the recent order are thus intertwined with the issues in the
pending appeals, we determine that granting the petition in these unusual circumstances are
warranted.") (emphasis added).
127 See Fiet, supra note 119, at 1322.
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to reach the proper claim construction without any fact-finding. 128 Adopting
a deferential standard of review, in contrast, would promote accuracy and
early certainty without increasing the Federal Circuit's caseload.
Early claim construction is also important because a reliable claim construc-
tion allows the parties to efficiently and accurately forecast how the trial itself
would turn out. This in turn promotes earlier settlement between the parties
and decreases the overall expense of litigation. 12 9 Adopting a more deferential
standard would also reduce litigation expense by discouraging losing parties
from filing questionable appeals to the Federal Circuit. Given the high reversal
rate faced by winning parties under the current system, 130 it makes sense for
the losing party to take another bite at the apple at the appellate stage. In
addition to increasing the Federal Circuit's the administrative burden, this
practice also diminishes the importance of the trial round. Indeed, Judge
Rader predicted this as one of the biggest problems with de novo review in
his dissenting opinion in Cybor.13 1
C. Criticisms of a More Deferential Standard
While a deferential standard of review would likely alleviate many of the
current problems plaguing claim construction, it is not a perfect solution. Critics
argue that a deferential standard may lead to inconsistent claim construction,
forum-shopping, and the insulation of trial level decisions from meaningful
appellate review.1 32 This section addresses each of these concerns.
128 Under the current regime, of course, claim construction is regarded as a pure legal
question, so arguably there should be no difficulty in reaching the correct result without any
trial-level record. The Federal Circuit's reluctance to take on claim construction at a preliminary
stage may be an implicit recognition that fact-finding is generally beneficial to reaching the
proper claim construction. See Fiet, supra note 119, at 1322 (questioning the ability of the
Federal Circuit to perform interlocutory appeals without a developed trial record).
129 For a similar discussion of the benefits of early claim determination, see Craig Allen
Nard, Certainty, Fence Building, and the UsefulArts, 74 IND. L.J. 759, 767 (1990) ("Early
certainty.., will (1) provide the patentee with a greater degree ofproprietary security, which in
turn will facilitate the commercialization of the claimed invention; and (2) spur the patentee's
competitors ... to either (a) enter into informed licensing negotiations ... ; (b) attempt to
improve upon the patented invention; or (c) design around the patented invention.").
130 See Fiet, supra note 119, at 1292.
131 See Cybor, 138 E3d at 1474 (Rader, J., dissenting) ("To my eyes, this rejection of the
trial process as the 'main event' will undermine, if not destroy, the values of certainty and
predictability sought by Markman L").
132 See Wallace, supra note 94, at 1401-02.
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1. Inconsistent Claim Construction
Perhaps the strongest argument against a deferential standard of review
is that it threatens to undermine the principal justification for creating the
Federal Circuit: uniformity. 13 3 Having a single appellate court review cases
de novo allows for much greater uniformity than if each trial court were to
operate independently; this uniformity would be eliminated if each trial court
decision were only reversible for clear error.
In particular, critics argue that a deferential review standard would lead
to the same claim having different constructions in different districts. 134 For
example, a patent holder may sue Company A for patent infringement in
District 1 and receive a broad claim construction from that judge. The same
patent holder, perhaps emboldened by this ruling, may file a patent infringe-
ment case against Company B in District 2. But District 2, hearing different
testimony, may decide that the patent claims are not very broad and may find
no infringement. Critics argue that this would lead to an untenable situation
where the patent has two different meanings to two different companies (and
perhaps geographic regions).135
This argument is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, inter-circuit inconsis-
tencies are not a new problem and are not unique to patent law; courts facing
such an issue frequently apply the concept of collateral estoppel to reach a
more uniform outcome. 136 Also, while circuits are generally not bound by
decisions of their sister circuits, there is no reason to believe that the district
courts, either informally or formally, would not consider staying their claim
construction ruling while another district entertains the same legal question. 137
133 Id. at 1402.
134 Id.
135 Indeed, the Supreme Court in Markman Isuggests that claim construction, as a ques-
tion of law, is subject to the principle of stare decisis, rather than the less controlling issue
preclusion doctrine. See Markman v. Westview Instruments (Markman I1), 517 U.S. 370,
391 (1995), affg 52 E3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995). If, on the other hand, claim construction is
properly seen as a mixed question of fact and law, then the principle of stare decisis should
not be applied. See Krinsky, supra note 120, at 222 (arguing that the Supreme Court can
provide for appropriate deference without undermining uniformity).
136 See Anthony M. Garza, Note, Collateral Estoppel and Claim Construction Orders:
Finality Problems and Vacatur Solutions, 6 COLUM. Sci. & TECH. L. REv. 4, (2005), available
at http://www.stlr.org/cite.cgi?volume=6&article=4.
137 It is not difficult to find cases in which a district court shows at least some deference
to another court's claim construction. See, e.g., KX Indus. v. PUR Water Purification Prods.,
108 E Supp. 2d 380, 387 (D. Del. 2000), affd, 18 Fed. Appx. 871 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("While
the court's previous opinion does not have issue preclusive effect against [the defendant]
in this case, to the extent that the parties do not raise new arguments, the court will defer
to its previous construction of the claims."); TM Patents, LP v. IBM Corp., 72 E Supp.
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Furthermore, rulings from other district courts would surely carry some
persuasive power in any subsequent cases that arise.138
Second, a more deferential review standard does not create any more sub-
stantial risk for a patent holder than under the current system; the Federal
Circuit is always free to affirm a narrow district court interpretation or reject
a broad construction. 139 Uncertainty for the patentee now rests between the
trial and appellate courts; deference would instead shift this uncertainty
to between districts. 4 ' Lastly, there is no reason to think that such a result
would necessarily create more harm to patent value than under the current
system.'41
2. Forum Shopping
Having a more deferential standard of review creates some forum-shopping
issues; knowing that the district court's ruling holds significant weight will
encourage litigants to file in a more hospitable forum. To some degree, this
is a moot point. -he vast majority of patent cases are already handled by just
a few jurisdictions either through self-selection or convenience, the forum-
shopping choices are already narrow. 142 Granting more deference to the trial
court is unlikely to cause a dramatic upheaval in most circuit dockets. Major
litigants are comfortable where they are already filing and will be likely to
risk 'trying the waters' in another circuit. In addition, the patent judge pilot
program, if enacted, may prove more of an attraction than any change in
the standard of review would cause. In the end, while forum-shopping is a
legitimate concern, it is unclear that there would be any major impact from
a change in the status quo.
3. Insulation from Appellate Review
Finally, a more deferential standard of review may permit trial judges to
insulate their decisions by engaging in even some minimal fact-finding in all
2d 370, 379 (S.D.N.Y 1999) ("[Collateral estoppel] is of marginal practical importance,
because I agree with just about everything Judge Young did when he construed the claims
in the [past] action.").
138 For a novel suggestion on how to gain collateral estoppel effect in claim construction,
see Garza, supra note 136, 4 (suggesting the use of motions for vacatur in order to achieve
the finality needed for collateral estoppel to apply to prior claim construction rulings).
139 SeeNard & Duffy, supra note 111, at 1670-71.
140 See id.
141 See id., at 1672 n.150 ("Nonetheless, a duopolistic patent-one with a dual claim
construction-can still be a powerful tool. Even a narrow scope resulting from the initial
action will have some leveraging authority because while issue preclusion may be available to
a subsequent alleged infringer, there always remains a degree of uncertainty in litigation.").
142 See Chu, supra note 84, at 1121.
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of their cases. 143 While this is a valid concern, the vast majority of cases are
determined based on the intrinsic evidence itself-no outside testimony is
needed.144 In these cases, the de novo standard of review would still apply. In
those cases where factual findings were necessary, the Federal Circuit would
have to apply a more deferential standard, but this is not necessarily a bad
thing. As stated previously, in many situations, the trial judges are better
equipped to make these factual determinations, which makes deference ap-
propriate. Furthermore, the Federal Circuit could help guide lower courts by
taking on so-called tone-settingcases-cases where the court does not actually
change the underlying law or doctrine, but instead takes a case and sends a
signal to the lower courts either to tighten or loosen how they are applying
the rules. The Supreme Court uses this approach in a number of areas where
the Court does not want to set a firm policy, but at the same time wants to
retain some control over how lower courts, acting within their own discretion,
apply the general guidelines. 45 In short, there are good reasons to insulate
lower court decisions from appellate review in some circumstances. This
does not mean, however, that the Federal Circuit will become powerless or
unable to promote certain ideals that it sees as fundamentally important or
necessary for patent law.
IV. Amgen and the Supreme Court's Missed Opportunity
Just as the Federal Circuit passed on a chance to reconsider its de novo
review standard, the Supreme Court also missed an opportunity to instruct
the lower courts and resolve any confusion created by Markman I. The Am-
gen case asked the Court to determine whether the appellate court should be
more deferential when reviewing the factual findings that underlie a district
143 An analogous argument has been made in the wake of eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C, 547 U.S. 388 (2006); seeAvailability ofInjunctive Relief, 120 HARV. L. REv. 332,338
(Nov. 2006) ("The fact that eBay provides district courts with broad discretion ... combined
with the deferential abuse of discretion standard, may effectively insulate these courts from
Federal Circuit review."). But see Arti K. Rai, Engaging Fact and Policy: A Multi-Institutional
Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLuM. L. REv. 1035, 1057-60 (2003) (arguing the
Federal Circuit will not give deference to factual findings in claim construction cases because
the claim is often determinative).
144 See Romary & Michelsohn, supra note 4, at 1891.
145 This is perhaps best seen in the criminal procedure context; the Supreme Court will
provide a basic rule then take subsequent cases when needed to correct how the lower courts
are applying the rule. Compare Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (providing general
rule that prosecutors must disclose "material" evidence favorable to the accused), with United
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (defining "material"), and Kyles v. Whitley, 514
U.S. 419, 435-37 (1995) (demonstrating how to apply the Brady doctrine).
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court's claim construction.116 Based on the troubled legacy of Markman II,
the Supreme Court should have answered this question in the affirmative.
Deference would have brought benefits to the patent community and would
have acknowledged the understated, but strong, convictions of many of the
Federal Circuit judges.
Why did the Supreme Court choose not to hear Amgen? There are at least
three possible explanations, one more worrisome than the others. First, the
Supreme Court may have wanted to give the Federal Circuit a brief reprieve;
Amgen would have been only the latest in a recent string of Supreme Court
cases to address major issues in patent law.147 Given the clear intra-circuit
disagreement on how to properly handle claim construction, the Supreme
Court's denial should permit the Federal Circuit to develop a coherent, well-
reasoned process for claim construction, which may or may not warrant later
Supreme Court review.
Second, and more worrisome, is that the Supreme Court sees nothing
wrong with the status quo. The Federal Circuit's approach is not clearly at
odds with the precedent set out by Markman II; its fault is more pragmatic
than philosophical. Only by witnessing the high reversal rates, the frustra-
tion expressed by lower courts, and the lack of a clear framework for claim
construction is it apparent that a change is needed. This explanation is wor-
risome because it suggests that the current problems facing the patent system
may not be resolved for quite some time.
Regardless of the reason for denial, it is clear that the Federal Circuit needs
to move away from de novo review as the touchstone for claim construction.
A more deferential standard of review would not contradict the teachings
of Markman I. The Supreme Court's focus in that case was on who should
bear responsibility for claim construction: the judge or jury.148 Throughout
the opinion, the Court notes that claim construction is a mixed question of
fact and law; the decision to place it in the hands of the judge was a practical
one, born out of policy.149 In Cybor, the Federal Circuit chose to minimize
146 The second issue raised byAmgen is whether the Federal Circuit has "effectively resur-
rected the categorical bar to a claim of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents that
was expressly rejected in Festo and Warner-Jenkinson." Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i,
Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2270 (2007) (No. 06-1291).
147 See, e.g., KSR Int'l v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. -', 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (rejecting
the Federal Circuit's rigid, narrow application of35 U.S.C. § 103's obviousness requirement);
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (requiring Federal Circuit to apply
traditional four-factor preliminary injunction standard).
148 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman 11), 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996),
affg 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
149 See id. at 378, 386.
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the significance of the Court's dicta in Markman II; perhaps by heeding the
Court's words a better solution can be drafted. 150
Looking past the potential benefits to litigants if the courts adopt a more
deferential standard of review, practical considerations of how claim construc-
tion is done at the trial level weigh against de novo review. Unlike contract
interpretation, where judges rely on the "four corners" of the contract itself to
provide answers, claim construction often requires the judge to consider outside
sources of information.151 While both benefit from the judge's "training in
exegesis," claim construction also benefits from credibility determinations.
Conclusion
Congress created the Federal Circuit in 1982 with the hope that a single
appellate court would foster uniformity and consistency in how patents are
treated. 152 The Federal Circuit's decisions in Markman I and Cybor, which
declared claim construction to be a purely legal inquiry subject to de novo
review, were also reached with the hope that they would increase certainty
within the field. 53 These hopes have not been realized, however, in the post-
Cybor world-district courts continue to face reversal rates as high as 40%, 154
while the Federal Circuit has struggled to develop a framework or consistent
guidelines for the lower courts to follow.155 Echoing the dissenting voices in
every major claim construction case the Federal Circuit has decided, scholars
and practitioners alike have called for a reevaluation of the de novo review
standard. 15 6
While the Federal Circuit has been unwilling, or unable, to move away
from de novo review, the Supreme Court missed an excellent opportunity with
Amgen to reconsider these earlier decisions. The Court's acknowledgment that
150 Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
"'1 Compare Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83
TEx. L. REv. 1581, 1596 (2005) (discussing the common law tradition which bars extrinsic
evidence which is outside the "four corners" of the written contract), with Cybor, 138 F.3d
at 1454 (discussing how the extrinsic evidence can be helpful in claim construction), and
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., (Markman 1) 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc), affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) ("[Extrinsic] evidence may be helpful to explain scientific
principles, the meaning of the technical terms, and terms of art that appear in the patent
and prosecution history.").
152 See Nard & Duffy, supra note 111, at 1624-25.
1 See Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1455; Markman 1, 52 F3d at 979.
154 See Wallace, supra note 94, at 1391.
155 See Dreyfuss, supra note 94, at 773 ("One concern is that the Federal Circuit is failing
to articulate the law at the appropriate level of detail, thereby leaving those who rely on it
with insufficient guidance.").
156 See Wallace, supra note 94, at 1400.
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a more deferential standard of review would foster uniformity and accuracy
would have reduced the Federal Circuit's caseload and decreased uncertainty
and expense for litigants, while treating the trial courts with respect and ap-
preciation. WhileJudge Newman noted in Cybor that "perfection is elusive,"'57
perhaps soon the courts will take this important step in the right direction.
157 See Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1418 (Newman, J., additional views).
